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All too often our national security and foreign policy institutions are slow to learn 
lessons from their own successes and failures. Lessons are identified and applied to an 
even lesser extent across different institutions and missions. But when problems and 
solutions are systemic – due to systems designed for a much different era – the 
experiences of one discrete organization or community can offer valuable insights to an 
entirely different set of actors.  
One issue that demands particular attention in the contemporary security 
environment is how best to apply whole-of-government approaches to complex national 
missions, ranging from combating terrorism and trafficking in persons to securing 
cyberspace. These and many other twenty-first-century security challenges require an 
agile and integrated response; however, our national security system is organized along 
functional lines (diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, etc...) with weak 
coordinating mechanisms across these functions. Today, there is no definitive model for 
integrating capabilities and funding for inherently interagency missions. 
Recent reforms in the U.S. government counterterrorism community provide a 
valuable case study on this subject for several reasons. First, the terrorist threat is 
representative of twenty-first-century national security challenges that are complex, 
trans-border, and fraught with multiple sets of networked, non-state adversaries. 
Second, like all multifaceted problems, counterterrorism requires a holistic approach to 
address; in this case, the law enforcement, financial, diplomatic, military, legal, and 
other dimensions of the terrorist threat. Third, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 
led to the most systemic review and subsequent set of national security reforms thus far 
in the 21st century. 
 The creation of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) within the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to conduct counterterrorism planning and 
assessments provides one model for integrating high-priority, high-complexity, multi-
agency missions. Interagency teams for other national missions, such as cyber-security, 
should be seriously considered to support the National Security Staff in strategic 
management of end-to-end processes (policy, strategy, aligning resources with strategy, 
planning, execution, and assessment) and to fulfill functions such as: 
• Clarifying interagency roles and responsibilities; 
• Conducting integrated policy analysis and teeing up policy options; 
• Developing national strategies;  
• Conducting deliberate, dynamic and/or contingency planning; 
• Conducting assessments of the nation’s progress in meetings its goals and 
objectives; and 
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• Conducting long-term assessments on the changing nature of the 
threat/opportunity. 
Certain key enablers must be in place for any interagency team or organization to be 
fully effective. These include: 
• A reporting chain to the president; 
• An institutionalized linkage to the National Security Staff; 
• Requisite authorities;1 
• Congressional support and clear jurisdictional ownership;  
• An untangling of overlapping mandates and authorities; and  
• Interagency national security professionals with critical experience and skill sets 
(e.g., planning and assessments, negotiation, appreciation of diverse agency 
cultures, etc.) and interagency and intergovernmental organizations with 
planning, execution, and reach-back capabilities. 
The 9/11 Commission found that the counterterrorism mission is in need of “joint 
planning” and “joint action” to ensure that unity of purpose and unity of effort are 
achieved. The Commission further recognized that the National Security Council staff, 
consumed with managing day-to-day crises, was unable to fulfill the functions of 
strategic planning and oversight and was therefore incapable of effectively managing a 
whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism on its own. Attempting to rectify 
these deficiencies, the Commission envisioned the National Counterterrorism Center as 
fulfilling these roles and “breaking the older mold of national government 
organization.”2    
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) established 
NCTC to serve as the U.S. government’s locus for counterterrorism intelligence and 
strategic operational planning. Part of the NCTC mandate was “to conduct strategic 
operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of 
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland 
security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.” To accomplish 
this, the IRTPA established the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning within 
NCTC and gave it responsibility for developing interagency strategic operational plans, 
assigning roles and responsibilities for plans, coordinating interagency operational 
activities, monitoring implementation of plans, and conducting assessments.3 
In February 2010, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) released a report 
– Towards Integrating Complex Missions: Lessons from the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning – that 
studied DSOP in depth and found it to be a promising example of a national-level 
integrating mechanism for a complex mission such as counterterrorism.4 The 
Directorate conducts a broad range of integrating functions including interagency 
planning, assessment, and resource oversight to help ensure a holistic approach to the 
mission. Although this fledgling institution continues to face the inherent challenges of 
operating in an outdated system, the concept it embodies – an interagency mechanism 
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to support the National Security Staff in strategic management of a discrete mission – is 
worthy of consideration in other contexts. 
Imagine, for example, an interagency cyber-security team chartered by the president 
and reporting to him through the National Security Staff. The team would report to the 
president, but could be housed in the Department of Homeland Security in the near-
term for administrative and other support.5 It would consist of a permanent cadre of 
subject matter experts and individuals trained in strategic planning and assessments 
working alongside detailees from across the government. A cyber-security team could 
assist senior policy-makers by analyzing policy options, teeing up decisions, and 
developing planning, resource, and assessment products related to cyber-security. More 
specifically, an interagency cyber-security team could: 
• Develop a comprehensive national cyber-security strategy that identifies goals 
and objectives and assigns roles and responsibilities; 
• Conduct interagency contingency planning to consider how the nation would 
respond to a variety of cyber attacks;  
• Conduct dynamic planning to disrupt or respond to an actual attack; 
• Conduct assessments to determine if the nation is making progress in achieving 
its goals and propose actions to increase effectiveness; 
• Conduct long-term assessments to consider what the cyber threat might look like 
in the future; 
• Perform various resource oversight functions in support the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB); and 
• Integrate perspectives of other mission partners such as intergovernmental, 
private sector, and non-government stakeholders. 
Today, no entity has responsibility for deliberately fulfilling these functions on a whole-
of-government basis for the cyber-security mission. Other interagency mission areas 
have integrating mechanisms in place, but most are not fulfilling these roles. For 
instance, the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) – also established by the 
IRTPA – does not have an equivalent to DSOP that looks beyond the intelligence 
community to conduct planning and assessments with all counter-proliferation 
stakeholders.   
Or consider human trafficking, a twenty-first-century national security concern that 
has been linked to organized crime, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist 
financing. Similar to counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and cyber-security, 
trafficking is a complex, multifaceted challenge that does not fall under the jurisdiction 
of any single executive branch organization. The anti-trafficking challenge unites nearly 
thirty offices in at least seven major U.S. government departments and agencies, as well 
as numerous intergovernmental and other mission partners. Out of recognition for the 
need to integrate these diverse capabilities, the President’s Interagency Task Force 
(PITF) and supporting Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) were established as 
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policy-coordinating bodies and a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) was 
created to serve as an information clearing house.6   
Despite these developments, the anti-trafficking mission is still without a national 
strategy that establishes goals and objectives and delineates roles and responsibilities. 
There is no national planning and assessments capability that can integrate the 
perspectives of all mission partners. What would an interagency planning cell within the 
HSTC look like?  Reporting to the president through the SPOG, this interagency team 
could lead all stakeholders (interagency and intergovernmental)7 in strategic planning 
and assessments for the anti-trafficking mission. 
The PNSR study identifies several important lessons from the DSOP experience that 
are applicable to other mission areas. First, this case study demonstrates the importance 
of a reporting chain to the president. The director of NCTC reports to the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) for the intelligence aspects of the NCTC mission but reports 
to the president for DSOP work on whole-of-government planning and assessments. 
This chain of command and proximity to the president convey an informal authority 
that is beneficial, if not necessary to lead an effective interagency team.   
In addition to a direct link to the president, just as critical is a seamless and 
institutionalized linkage to the team’s customers in the interagency space – including 
relevant National Security Staff Directorates, NSC Committees, and OMB staff. These 
relationships are necessary to stay relevant and add value as organizational 
arrangements and policy priorities shift within and across administrations.   
Moreover, the linkage to Congress is just as critical. The lack of congressional 
oversight and funding mechanisms that can look holistically at a complex national 
mission such as counterterrorism or cyber-security will also inhibit the effectiveness of 
any interagency team. A congressional champion is critical to resource the team and to 
provide streamlined oversight of the national mission. Furthermore, Congress must 
resource the participating departments and agencies that are being asked to contribute 
to a mission that may not be a core part of their mandate. 
The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS)8 is an example of the “lead agency” approach to integration. 
S/CRS was established in 2004 to support the secretary of state in leading and 
coordinating U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The office has 
made progress integrating U.S. government capabilities to prepare, plan for, and 
conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities, but these efforts have been hindered 
as a result of S/CRS being buried within the State Department and without strong and 
consistent congressional support.9 
In addition to the informal authority brought about by proximity to the president, the 
relevancy derived from an institutionalized relationship with the National Security Staff, 
and the formal authority derived from a champion on the Hill, other systemic 
impediments will plague any future interagency team just as they have plagued DSOP. 
For any complex, multi-agency mission such as counterterrorism or cyber-security, 
untangling overlapping mandates and authorities to ensure that all actors understand 
the need for the existence of, and leadership from, an interagency team is necessary for 
the team to achieve its full potential.   
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Any planning cell – including DSOP and S/CRS – will suffer from a lack of civilian 
planning and assessment capacity resident throughout the U.S. government. Until a 
government-wide human capital system is established to provide personnel with the 
necessary experience, expertise, and incentive, an interagency team will struggle to find 
sufficient numbers of individuals with the right skill sets. Beyond trained individuals, 
entire departments must be prepared to provide planning and reach-back support to 
personnel deployed to the field or to an interagency team in Washington.10    
Complex national missions such as cyber-security, reconstruction and stabilization, 
and anti-trafficking in persons demand an integrated approach. Formal integrating 
mechanisms are needed to support an overburdened and understaffed National Security 
Staff. The experience of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning within the 
National Counterterrorism Center offers many valuable lessons for future interagency 
teams and provides insights into the challenges associated with operating in an outdated 
system. Before true integration can be achieved, the overall national security system 
must be modernized and recalibrated to put national missions ahead of parochial 
interests. Absent holistic reform, however, much can be done to improve on existing 
approaches and bolster mechanisms that enable the United States to bring all its 
capabilities to bear in the twenty-first-century security environment. 
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1 For a discussion on a range of possible integrating functions and authorities, see: Project on National 
Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (Arlington: Project on National 
Security Reform, 2010), http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf.  
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 399-403.  
3 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 119 Stat. 3673 (2004). 
4 Project on National Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from 
the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (Arlington: 
Project on National Security Reform, 2010), http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf.  
5 The current national security system cannot accommodate an entity like DSOP standing on its own in 
the “interagency space”—the space below the president and above the departments.  Just as DSOP is 
housed within NCTC inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, any new team will require 
an organizational home for administrative and other support.  One option for a long-term solution is to 
build a capacity in the National Security Council staff to either a) house and manage priority teams or b) 
manage priority missions along with the overall system from a central hub. For a thoughtful discussion on 
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see: Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, VA: Project on National 
Security Reform, 2008), 138-140; 573, 
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